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TORTS
ELLEN M. KELLY*

The two-year survey period covered by this Article saw New Mexico
courts make sweeping changes in joint liability concepts and the law of
slander and libel. For the first time they also recognized claims for bystander recovery and dram shop liability. Several decisions clarified the
courts' interpretations of the Medical Malpractice Act' and the Tort Claims
Act. 2 This Article covers all these subjects, not necessarily in the above
order, along with some miscellaneous decisions which cannot be neatly
cubbyholed.
I. JOINT LIABILITY AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
In 1981, Scott v. Rizzo 3 introduced a new era of negligence law in New
Mexico. The stir created by the adoption of pure comparative negligence
in Scott was equaled if not surpassed by the court of appeals' much less
expected abolition of joint and several liability and contribution among
joint tortfeasors in most situations in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding
Supply, Inc.4 and the cases which followed it.
In Bartlett, the trial court allowed the jury to compare the fault of the
driver of the first of three vehicles involved in a collision, even though
the first driver was not a party to the suit and was unidentified. The jury
determined the defendant was thirty percent at fault and the unknown
driver was seventy percent at fault.
Part of the holding in Bartlett involved the effect of comparative fault
on New Mexico's Joint Tortfeasor's Act, which allowed one tortfeasor
5
to compel other tortfeasors to share responsibility for paying damages.
Under the act, a tortfeasor who paid a judgment or settled with the plaintiff
could try to collect a share of the amount he had paid the plaintiff from
other tortfeasors through a suit for contribution. The issue for the Bartlett
court was whether the defendant should be held liable under the act for
* J.D., University of New Mexico, 1980; Shareholder, Gallagher & Casados, Albuqerque, New
Mexico.
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
2. Id. §§41-4-1 to -29.
3. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981).
4. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-3-1 to -8 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
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all the damages, including those caused by the phantom driver, or just
for the thirty percent of the damages attributed to him.
In the past, the courts had held it was permissible to force one defendant
to pay all the damages and then collect a portion from any other tortfeasors
on the theory that "any accident was the result of one indivisible wrong. 6
The courts had also held it was fairer to make one defendant pay for all
the damages than it was to have a plaintiff bear the risk of being unable
to collect his judgment. 7
The Bartlett court rejected these arguments and held a jury may as-8
certain the percentage of negligence of all participants to an occurrence.
It found the concept of one indivisible wrong to be obsolete and determined it was not fair to predicate the extent of liability of a defendant
on the solvency of his co-defendant, rather than blameworthiness. 9
Wilson v. Galt° reiterated and emphasized Bartlett's de facto abolition
of joint and several liability. The Wilson trial was held after the Scott v.
Rizzo decision but before Bartlett." In Wilson, the plaintiffs, in their
capacities as the parents and the conservator of their brain-damaged minor
son, sued the mother's obstetrician, a pediatrician, a hospital, and the
hospital's lab supervisor for birth-related injuries to the child. All the
defendants except the obstetrician and the lab supervisor settled before
trial for more than the amount of damages subsequently assessed by the
jury. The jury determined the obstetrician was not at fault, while the lab
supervisor was fifteen percent at fault.' 2
The first issue the appellate court addressed in this portmanteau case 3
was:
As a matter of law can an injured party recover an amount reflecting
a nonsettling tortfeasor's negligence when the injured party has recovered, through settlement with other tortfeasors, an amount in
excess of the entire damage award determined by the jury? 4
The answer is 'Yes.' Joint and several liability was the rule at common
law, and New Mexico's adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act' 5 created the right to contribution among joint tortfeasors.
6. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581.
7. Id.at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
8. Id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
9. Id.
10. 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308
(1983).
11. Id.at 230, 668 P.2d at 1107.
12. Id.
13. For a discussion of Wilson's impact on the law of loss of consortium, see infra note 113 and
accompanying text. The case also involves many issues not material to this Article.
14. 100 N.M. at 230, 668 P.2d at 1107.
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-3-1 to -8 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
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Once Bartlett eliminated joint and several liability, however, the need for
contribution also vanished, 6 and the contribution act became a vestigial
statute.
The Wilson court also held a settlement satisfies only the settling party's
percentage of fault. If it turns out the settling defendant has paid more
than his share, he is out of luck. If the plaintiff has accepted too little
from any party, the bad luck is his, but he is still free to pursue his claims
against the other defendants who have not settled; that is, he can collect
their share of his damages in addition to the settlement amount. 17
The court of appeals found its approach would encourage settlement
and would fit New Mexico's view of comparative negligence. It also
made sense from a practical point of view:
This approach also discourages other tortfeasors from taking advantage of the good faith efforts of settling tortfeasors. If reduction of
money damages is allowed, the non-settling tort feasor would likely
sit back knowing not only that he could be liable in any event merely
for his share, but also, if by chance the settling tortfeasor pays an
amount greater than the total damages, as determined by the jury,
he will not have to pay at all. He has the added advantage during
the trial of placing the blame on the settling absent tortfeasors.' 8
In Wilson, however, the settlement agreement specifically barred recovery
from the non-settling defendants if the amount of the settlement exceeded
the plaintiffs' total damages as determined by the jury. The court of appeals
upheld that provision of the agreement."
The other major comparative fault case decided during the survey
period is the only one where the court of appeals strayed from the course
set by logic and by the holdings of Scott and Bartlett. In Guitardv. Gulf
Oil Co., 2' the plaintiff was an employee of Harrison Western Corp. (Harrison) when he was injured. Harrison was a contractor working under
Gulf Oil Co. (Gulf), which was in charge of the project. Harrison paid
worker's compensation benefits to Guitard following his injury."'
Guitard then sued Gulf, claiming it failed to inspect and to maintain
equipment and failed to warn of defects in the equipment. Gulf brought
Harrison into the case on a third-party complaint, saying it was entitled
to indemnification from Harrison under a written agreement. Gulf also
claimed Harrison had been negligent in causing the accident. 22
16. 100 N.M. at 232, 668 P.2d at 1109.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 233, 668 P.2d at 1110.
20. 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App. 1983). See also, Otten & Wilson Commercial Law,
15 N.M.L. Rev. (1985), in this issue (discussing Guitard).
21. Id. at 359, 670 P.2d at 970.
22. Id.
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The trial court granted Harrison's motion for summary judgment, finding the indemnification agreement violated N.M. Stat. Ann. section 567-2 (1978).23 This statute nullifies indemnification provisions pertaining
to mining operations if the damages arise from
[t]he sole or concurrent negligence of the indemnitee or the agents
or employees of the indemnitee or any independent contractor who
is directly responsible to such indemnitee or from any accident which
occurs in operations carried on at the direction or the supervision of
the indemnitee or an employee or representative of the indemnitee
or in accordance with methods and means specified by the indemnitee
or employees or representatives of the indemnitee.24
The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment, basing its decision on the Wyoming case of Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson.25
The Guitard court determined the statutory language "'arising from the
.. . concurrent negligence of the indemnitee,' . . . means only that the
26
indemnitee cannot contract away liability for its own negligence."
The Guitard court failed to recognize that under Scott, Bartlett, and
Wilson Gulf would only be liable for that portion of Guitard's damages,
if any, which Gulf caused. Therefore, there could be nothing for which
Harrison would have to indemnify Gulf, since even the Guitard court
recognized that Gulf, as the indemnitee, could not demand reimbursement
from Harrison for the damages Gulf caused. The court's later assertion
that "Gulf would be liable for 100% of the damages . . even though it
was only 1% negligent"" was wrong, as was the later statement that
Western will be responsible for its percentage of negligence,
"Harrison
28
if any."
The only reference to Bartlett in Guitard was in its holding that the
fault of an absent tortfeasor could be compared with the fault of the
parties to a case. 29 Despite its recognition of that principle, the court felt
dismissing Harrison from the case "would mean that in a negligence
action a party could never be brought in under N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978,
Civ. P. R. 14 (Repl. Pamp. 1980)," the rule governing third party practice.'
The court held "Bartlett did not intend such sweeping changes in thirdparty practice." 3 In fact, that was neither the intent nor really the result
23. Id.
24. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-7-2(A) (1978). This provision states that it shall not affect the validity
of any insurance contract or any benefit conferred under worker's compensation law. Id.
25. 578 P.2d 1351 (Wyo. 1978).
26. 100 N.M. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 363, 670 P.2d at 974.
29. Id. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
30. Id. (citing N.M. R. Civ. P. 14).
31. Id.
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of Bartlett. While Bartlett certainly eliminates most if not all claims for
contribution as the basis for a third-party complaint, N.M. R. Civ. P. 14
would still cover a valid claim for indemnification.32
II. BYSTANDER RECOVERY
Ramirez v. Armstrong33 held that bystanders to an accident may recover
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress for witnessing injuries suffered by another, if the plaintiff can prove several elements. The
elements are:
1. The plaintiff had a marital or intimate familial relationship with
the victim of the accident. Only the victim's husband, wife,
parents, children, brothers, sisters, grandparents, grandchildren,
or persons standing in loco parentis to the victim can qualify.' 4
2. The plaintiff's shock must be severe and result from the plaintiff
having a "contemporaneous sensory perception" of the accident.35
Presumably, this means hearing an accident as it occurred might
qualify, even if the plaintiff had not seen the accident.36 For a
shock to qualify as "severe," the distress "must be of a severity
which no reasonable person could be expected to endure. "37 This
is the same level of distress required for an actionable claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
3. As a result of his emotional distress, the plaintiff must have
incurred a physical injury of his own, or at least a "physical
manifestation" of the emotional distress.38
4. The victim of the accident must be injured or killed as a result
of the accident.39
In Ramirez, the complaint alleged a vehicle struck and killed Jose
Ramirez as he crossed a street. The plaintiff filed bystander recovery
claims on behalf of three of Ramirez' children (Job and Elena, who
allegedly saw the accident, and Bertha, who was not present) and a young
girl named Karen who was living with the Ramirez family, but who was
32. While an employer may subject himself to more than worker's compensation liability by
contract, City of Artesia v. Carter, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M.
628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980), that contractual provision should be void if it would cause the employer
to indemnify someone for that person's portion of fault.
33. 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
34. Id. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825.
35. Id. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26.
36. The court, however, expressly held that learning of the accident after its occurrence would
not meet this portion of the requirements for bystander recovery. Id. at 542, 673 P.2d at 826. Thus,
a plaintiff who sees or hears an accident but does not realize he is related to the victim until the
moment of the collision or accident has passed probably would not meet the test.
37. Id. at 541 n.l., 673 P.2d at 825 n.1.
38. Id. at 542, 673 P.2d at 826.
39. Id.
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not a family member. The supreme court upheld the trial court's dismissal
of the suit as to Karen and Bertha, because they failed to meet elements
one and two, respectively, but allowed it to proceed for Job and Elena.
However, in recognizing bystander recovery as a cause of action in
New Mexico, the court specifically noted that comparative fault applied'
and that this new cause "imposes no new obligation of conduct on potential defendants. Ordinary care is still required, and use of such ordinary
care will relieve potential defendants from liability." 4'
III. DRAM SHOP LIABILITY
Since 1982, New Mexico has seen the supreme court adopt and the
legislature subsequently contract "dram shop liability." In Lopez v. Maez 2
the court abandoned New Mexico's common law rule that a third party
could not hold a tavern keeper liable for injuries inflicted by an intoxicated
person who had been served at the tavern. The basic issue in any given
case, the court held, will turn on whether the acts of the bar's patron
were or would have been "reasonably foreseeable" by the tavern owner.43
Whether the acts of the patron constituted an independent intervening
cause that would relieve the tavern owner of liability will be a question
of fact in each case. an
In MRC Properties,Inc. v. Gries,45 the defendants before the court
were not bar owners, but social hosts. Conquistadores, Inc., had sponsored a Christmas party, catered by and held at a hotel, for its employees.
At the party two adults each bought one beer for a nineteen-year-old
employee of Conquistadores. The nineteen-year-old was the driver of a
car involved in an accident after he left the party.46
On appeal, the court held both the employer and the hotel could be
liable if they had violated a statute or regulation concerning the sale or
furnishing of liquor and if the violation had proximately caused the plaintiff's damages.47 Statutes which may impose liability for the sale or
furnishing of alcoholic beverages include section 60-7A-16,48 which prohibits furnishing alcohol to intoxicated persons, and section 60-7B-1,
which prohibits selling or giving liquor to a minor. In 1982, however,
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982).
Id. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1276.
Id.
98 N.M. 710, 652 P.2d 732 (1982).
Id. at 711, 652 P.2d at 733.
Id. at 712, 652 P.2d at 734.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-7A-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
Id. §60-7B-1.
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the legislature passed section 41-11-1,50 which eliminates liability under
section 60-7A- 16 for persons gratuitously serving liquor to a guest, unless
the host provided the drinks "recklessly in disregard of the rights of
others." The same statute relieves licensees of liability for serving intoxicated persons, unless it was reasonably apparent to the licensee the
person was intoxicated or the licensee knew from the circumstances the
person was intoxicated.
IV. LIBEL AND SLANDER
In Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc.,5" the United States Supreme Court
announced that states no longer could impose liability without fault for
libel or slander in favor of a private individual and against a publisher
or broadcaster.52 As a result, in Marchiondo v. Brown,53 the New Mexico
Supreme Court adopted the elements of proof required by the Gertz Court
in suits brought by "non-public" defamation plaintiffs.
In Marchiondo, however, the New Mexico court addressed the necof proof only after determining the plaintiff was not a
essary standard 54
"public figure." The court held Marchiondo was not a public figure as
far as the articles and editorials in question were concerned, because
although he was a lawyer and "well known as a member of the Democratic
Party," his influence in these roles "cannot be said to be pervasive.""
Publication of the challenged statements, rather than anything the plaintiff
had done, created the controversy in question.56
Because Marchiondo was not a public figure for the purposes of libel
law, the court determined the principles which would apply in his case
and any others brought by private individuals. First, the standard for
liability of a publisher or broadcaster is set by the standards of ordinary
negligence. 57 Second, if a plaintiff has shown only a lack of ordinary
care rather than something more grievous, the plaintiff may collect only
"actual damages." These may include out-of-pocket losses, impairment
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-11-1 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
51. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
52. In other words, strict liability, or libel per se, no longer applies for actions brought by a nonpublic defamation plaintiff. Gertz gave states some latitude in defining the appropriate standard of
liability so long as they do not impose strict liability. See id. at 341-48.
53. 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982).
54. The question of whether a plaintiff qualifies as a "public figure" is a preliminary question of
law for the court. Id. at 399, 649 P.2d at 467. If the plaintiff is determined to be a public official
or a public figure, or if the controversial statement involves a matter of public concern, the plaintiff
must prove the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth or with knowledge the published
statement was false in order to recover. Id. at 399-402, 649 P.2d at 467-70.
55. Id. at 399, 649 P.2d at 467.
56. Id. at 399-400, 649 P.2d at 467-68.
57. Id. at 402, 649 P.2d at 470.
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of reputation and standing in the community, humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering.58 If the private plaintiff wants to recover punitive
damages, he must make the same showing a public figure must make to
recover anything at all-that the defendant acted with a reckless disregard
for the truth or with knowledge of the falsity of the published statements. 59
The Marchiondoopinion also held the plaintiff was entitled to discovery
on which of the defendants' employees made certain decisions about how
and why the newspaper published some of the challenged articles or
headlines. The court specifically rejected the defendants' argument that
the first amendment protected the information sought."
In another suit against a news organization, Coronado Credit Union v.
KOAT Television, Inc.,6 1 the plaintiff claimed a broadcast made by the
defendant started a run on the credit union by depositors. One of the
issues was whether the plaintiff was a public or private figure. The issue
was important in this case because KOAT raised the defense of "fair
comment," which is
[p]redicated upon the principle that the interests of society are furthered through a free discussion of public affairs and matters of public
interest. In order to come within the ambit of this defense it must
be shown that the publication relates to a matter of public interest;
that it does not impute dishonorable motives to the subject; and that
it must constitute an expression of opinion on based [sic] truly stated
facts. 62
The defendant has the burden of establishing the plaintiff is a public
figure by a preponderance of the evidence.63 The court held the credit
union was a public figure in this case, because it was chartered to serve
members of the public, it was subject to supervision by the state, the
broadcasts involved matters of public concern, and the public at large,
as well as the credit union's 4,000 members, had an interest in plaintiff's
financial condition.' 4 The court also noted the "fair comment" defense
is available only if the comments are accurate or a fair abridgment.65
Coronado Credit Union also involved a question of whether some of
the statements were statements of fact or opinion, which is normally
58. Id. "A private defamation plaintiff must plead and prove special damages in order to recover
them." Id. While this reference might be clearer, it appears the court was using the terms "special
damages" and "actual damages" or "actual injury" interchangeably.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 398-99, 649 P.2d at 466-67.
61. 99 N.M. 233, 656 P.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1982).
62. Id. at 240, 656 P.2d at 903.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 241, 656 P.2d at 904.
65. Id. at 242, 656 P.2d at 905.
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determined by the fact-finder.' In addressing that issue, the court noted
if a statement does not disclose all the facts upon which an "opinion" is
based, the statement may be considered factual and, therefore, a proper
subject for a defamation suit. This is true if there are "implications in
the statement that the writer has private, underlying knowledge to substantiate his comments about plaintiff, and such knowledge implies the
existence of defamatory facts." 67
The plaintiff in Sands v. American G.I. Forum was also determined
to be a public figure. The controversy involved in Sands arose when the
defendant objected to the plaintiff's possible promotion to brigadier general from the rank of colonel in the United States Air Force.69 The plaintiff,
as a public figure, had to prove with "clear and convincing clarity" that
the offending statements were made with actual malice; that is, with
knowledge the statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether
it was true. To be clear and convincing, the evidence must be "strong,
positive and free from doubt"-somewhere between a preponderance of
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.70
In Zuniga v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co.,7 the plaintiff sued for slander
and wrongful discharge. The trial court granted the defendant's summary
judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.7 2 The slander claim involved
statements made to Sears management by a Sears security guard who
suspected a theft, statements made by the management to the plaintiff,
and statements made by Sears to the Employment Security Division during
66. In distinguishing between a statement of opinion and a statement of fact-a necessary distinction because opinion cannot be the basis of a defamation suit, while a statement appearing to
be a statement of a false fact can-Marchiondo held the court should consider: (1)the entirety of
a publication; (2) the extent speculation is necessary to determine whether the statement is true; and
(3) whether a reasonably prudent person seeing or hearing the statement would consider it fact or
opinion. 98 N.M. at 401, 649 P.2d at 469.
67. 99 N.M. at 239, 656 P.2d at 902.
68. 97 N.M. 625, 642 P.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1982).
69. The G.I. Forum sent an "affidavit or purported affidavit" to the Air Force in opposition to
the plaintiff's promotion, accusing the plaintiff of having orders backdated to allow him to avoid
serving in Vietnam. Id. at 626-27, 642 P.2d at 612-13.
70. 97 N.M. at 629, 642 P.2d at 615.
71. 100 N.M. 414, 671 P.2d 662 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983).
72. Id. at 416, 418, 671 P.2d at 664, 666.
The wrongful discharge claim could not stand because Sears fired the plaintiff for allegedly stealing
merchandise, rather than for refusing to do something public policy would condemn or for performing
an act public policy would encourage. Id. at 417, 671 P.2d at 665. Vigil v. Arzola, 22 N.M. Bar
Bull. 868 (Ct. App. 1983), set out the elements of "wrongful discharge" suits in reversing a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal for the defendants. However, the supreme court's opinion, 101 N.M. 687, 687
P.2d 1038 (1984), only held the complaint stated a cause of action. The court found the allegations
that the plaintiff was fired even though procedures set out in an employment manual were not
followed and that the manual constituted an employment contract to be sufficient. The supreme court
did not address the question of whether wrongful discharge could be asserted as a cause of action
in situations where there is no contract.
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a hearing on the plaintiff's unemployment benefits.73 The defendants
claimed a qualified privilege because they were entitled to talk about an
employee "if for a proper purpose and to one having a legitimate interest
in the subject matter of the statements. "74 The court of appeals found the
evidence supported the privilege. Because there was no evidence the
privilege had been abused, the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment. "An abuse of the privilege arises if the publisher lacks belief
or reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the alleged defamatory
statements. "75
V. TORT CLAIMS ACT
76
Most of the decisions concerning New Mexico's Tort Claims Act
involved procedural rather than substantive issues. Wells v. County of
Valencia,7 7 held the plaintiff, who claimed he tripped in a hole in his jail
cell, could sue under both 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment and the Tort Claims Act.78 The section 1983 suit
did not bar the other claim because "not all tortious conduct amounts to
constitutional deprivation. -71
In Tafoya v. Doe,s° the trial court found the mother received an incorrect
Rh factor blood transfusion at Carrie Tingley, a state-run hospital, in
1972. She learned from her physician in 1979 that she had an Rh-positive
sensitization in her blood; at that time, she was also told that the baby
she was carrying probably would have a blood immunization problem.
The baby was born August 26, 1979 and did, in fact, have the problem.
The doctor advised the mother not to have any more children because of
the immunization factor in her blood. The doctor also told her an earlier
incorrect transfusion caused the condition. The mother then initiated the
action against the hospital on her behalf and on behalf of her infant
daughter."s
The issue in Tafoya concerned the question of notice to the state of
the plaintiffs' claims. In Tafoya, the mother did not give written notice
until July 31, 1980, when she discovered where she had received the
incorrect transfusion .82 Section 41-4-16 of the Tort Claims Act generally
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

100 N.M. at 416-17, 671 P.2d at 664-65.
Id. at 417, 671 P.2d at 665.
Id. at 418, 671 P.2d at 666.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
98 N.M. 3, 644 P.2d 517 (1982).
Id. at 6, 644 P.2d at 520.
Id. at 7, 644 P.2d at 521.
100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 327, 671 P.2d 580 (1983).
Id. at 330-31, 670 P.2d at 583-84.
Id.
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requires all claimants to give written notice of their claims to certain
public agencies within ninety days of the occurrence giving rise to the
claim.8 3 The court held that, if the hospital did not have actual notice of
the incorrect transfusion in 1972, written notice was required for the
mother's claim and that notice had to be given within ninety days of
August 26, 1979, even if the mother did not remember where she received
the earlier transfusion until July 1980.84
The baby, however, was not required to give notice within ninety days
of her birth, even though the Tort Claims Act requires everyone except
those incapacitated "by reason of injury," to give notice within 90 days
of the occurrence." The court held the ninety-day requirement unconstitutional for the baby's claim, because it violated due process.8 6 The
court implied its holding would have been different if the statute had a
section similar to section 41-4-16(C) providing for notice to be given on
the child's behalf. 87 Section 41-4-16(C) allows the personal representative
of a deceased or a person claiming benefits from a wrongful death action
88
to provide the required notice within six months of the date of death.
In other tort claims decisions:
" The supreme court held a state police report of an automobile accident
does not constitute actual notice of an accident to the state and all
its agencies within the meaning of section 41-4-16.89 To avoid the
requirement for written notice of an accident, the particular agency
causing the alleged harm must have received actual notice.
• The court of appeals determined governmental entities are immune
from suit on strict liability claims, because the legislature, in adopting
the Tort Claims Act, waived immunity only for claims of negligence
in certain activities. 9°
" The court of appeals found the two-year statute of limitations for
Tort Claims Act suits in section 41-4-15 supersedes the three-year
limit set in section 37-1-24 for suits against cities, towns, or villages .91

* The supreme court held, in Cole v. City of Las Cruces,92 that the city
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
84. 100 N.M. at 331, 670 P.2d at 584.
85. Id. at 331-32, 670 P.2d at 584-85.
86. Id. at 332, 670 P.2d at 585.
87. Id.
88. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-4-16(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
690 P.2d 1019 (1984).
89. State v. Garcia,__ N.M. -,
90. McMurry v. City of Farmington, 97 N.M. 728, 643 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1982). The plaintiff
alleged that the fire department created an unreasonably dangerous condition by setting controlled
fires so firemen could practice putting them out and that she was injured by inhaling metals released
by the fires. Id. at 729-30, 643 P.2d at 293-94.
91. Cozart v. Town of Bernalillo, 99 N.M. 737, 738, 663 P.2d 713, 714 (Ct. App. 1983).
92. 99 N.M. 302, 657 P.2d 629 (1983).
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was subject to suit as "a governmental entity" for an injury stemming
from its operation of a natural gas pipeline outside the city limits."
The court also held that the private corporation which apparently
owned the pipeline system the city operated was not an "instrumentality" of the city, so it was not covered by the Tort Claims Act.94
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the act could not cover
activities outside the city's authority.95
VI. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Several major cases during the survey period concerned the interaction
of the general statutes of limitations and the provisions of New Mexico's
Medical Malpractice Act.' The complaint in Armijo v. Tandysh97 alleged
the deceased died September 13, 1977 as a result of malpractice committed in May 1977. The plaintiff filed the complaint in August 1980.98
The court of appeals had to determine if the complaint was timely. If the
Wrongful Death Act" applied, the complaint could be filed any time
within three years of the date of death," ° and the complaint could stand.
But the court found the specific inclusion of wrongful death as a claim
covered by the Medical Malpractice Act'o' meant the suit had to be filed
within "three years after the date that the act of malpractice occurred,"'° 2
the specific and only statute of limitation contained in the Medical Malpractice Act.
The legislature enacted the Malpractice Act after New Mexico's courts
already had ruled the statute of limitation in a malpractice case starts to
run at the time of the act causing injury.' 3 The act limits the liability of
certain types of health care providers who elect to participate in the state's
patient compensation fund. " The Armijo plaintiff argued the act's statute
of limitation found in section 41-5-13-three years from the act of malpractice, rather than three years from the occurrence of injury-applied
93. Id. at 303, 657 P.2d at 630.
94. Id. at 305, 657 P.2d at 632.
95. Id.
96. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
97. 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794
(1982).
98. 98 N.M. at 184, 646 P.2d at 1248.
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-2-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
100. Id. §41-2-2.
101. Id. §§41-5-1 to -28.
102. 98 N.M. at 183, 646 P.2d at 1247; see N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-13 (Repl. Parnp. 1982).
103. See Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963). For a history of the Medical
Malpractice Act, see Kovnat, Medical Malpractice Legislation in New Mexico, 7 N.M.L. Rev. 5
(1976-77).
104. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-6 (Repi. Pamnp. 1982).
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only to health care providers who "qualified" by participating in the
compensation fund. °5
The court rejected that assertion. Because the limitation period in effect
when the act was passed was the same as the period contained in the act,
it could not be considered a "benefit" of the new law. Moreover, section
41-5-13 itself does not distinguish between qualified and non-qualified
providers, so the same limitations period would apply to all health care
providers and there was no classification that could violate the equal
protection requirement."°
In Ealy v. Sheppeck, 07 the plaintiff recognized the statute of limitations
had run before the suit was filed, but argued the defendant's fraudulent
concealment, continuing tortious conduct, and false misrepresentation
tolled the statute. It was the plaintiff's burden to establish a material fact
about tolling that would defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and in Ealy, the plaintiff failed to meet the burden before the trial
court or on appeal.'0 8 The case is significant for the court's apparent
recognition that tolling of the limitations period in section 41-5-13 might
occur in some cases.
In Saiz v. Barham,"9 the alleged malpractice occurred July 3, 1979,
and the application for review by the Medical Legal Review Commission
was filed on July 2, 1982 pursuant to sections 41-5-14(A) and 41-5-15.
The commission's decision was reached November 20, 1982; it was
mailed on November 22. The plaintiff's attorney received a copy through
certified mail on December 2, 1982. The attorney received another copy
addressed to the plaintiff in care of the attorney on the same day. The
plaintiff then filed suit on December 30, 1982. The defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired." 0
In its decision the court determined that the filing was timely. The
Medical Malpractice Act provides that the statute of limitations is tolled
upon the presentation of a claim to the commission; the statute of limitations does not start to run again until thirty days after the commission's
decision is entered in the commission's files and a copy of the decision
is served on the claimant and his attorney by certified mail."' The limitations period would have expired July 5, 1982 (July 3 was a Saturday),
so when the application was filed July 2, 1982, three days of the limitation
period remained. The thirty-day grace period following the commission's
105.
106.
107.
(1983).
108.
109.
110.
111.

98 N.M. at 184, 646 P.2d at 1248.
Id.
100 N.M. 250, 669 P.2d 259 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 259, 669 P.2d 735
Id. at 250-51, 669 P.2d at 259-60.
100 N.M. 596, 673 P.2d 1329 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 689,675 P.2d 421 (1983).
Id. at 597, 673 P.2d at 1330.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-22 (Repl. Panp. 1982).
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decision would have expired December 22, 1982, but since service was
made by mail, the plaintiff received an additional three days by analogy
to Rule 6(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure of the District Courts. Because
December 25, 1982 was a holiday (and a Saturday), the expiration of the
thirty-day tolling period that automatically followed the commission's
decision expired December 27, 1982. The plaintiff still had three days
limitation period,
left in which to file left over from the original three-year
11 2
so the filing on December 30, 1982 was timely.
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
The following decisions do not fall into any special category; they are
included because they deal with issues that will probably recur.
" In Wilson v. Gait,"3 the court of appeals ruled New Mexico does
not recognize a cause of action for the loss of a child's society.
" Kabella v. Bouschelle"4 held there is no cause of action in negligence
for injuries of a participant in a contact sport caused by another
participant, although the court recognized claims for reckless or willful conduct.
* Miera v. Waltmeyer" 5 involved a malicious prosecution case. The
court of appeals held that the conviction of the plaintiff of battery in
municipal court created a rebuttable presumption that the defendant
police officer had probable cause for the arrest, even though the
conviction was reversed after a de novo trial in district court.
" According to Livingston v. Begay,116 a hotel operator cannot be held
strictly liable for defects in the fixtures, furnishings, or design of his
rooms.

112. Id. at 599-600, 673 P.2d at 1332-33. The court also held that, as there was no doubt that
the copies of the decision were actually received, service under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-22 (Repl.
Pamp. 1982) was complete upon the mailing of the decision on November 22, 1982. 100 N.M. at
599, 673 P.2d at 1332. In addition, the court determined that service by certified mail on the plaintiff
at the office of his attorney met the requirement of the statute. Id.
113. 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308
(1983).
114. 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1983).
115. 97 N.M. 588, 642 P.2d 191 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 52, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982).
116. 98 N.M. 712, 652 P.2d 734 (1982).

